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Abstract
CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars.
We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their
incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional
norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will
weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of
legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when
internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrat-
ing that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that
CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives.
We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in
4,184 cross-border acquisitions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Human resource management (HRM) professionals and academics
have long been interested in understanding the effect of CEO incen-
tives on firm behaviors (e.g., Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, Boyle, &
Joo, 2018; Benischke, Martin, & Glaser, 2019; Bragaw & Misangyi,
2017; Seo, 2017; Sung, Choi, & Kang, 2017; Wang & Singh, 2014;
Werner & Ward, 2004). Within this body of research, an increasing
number of human resource scholars have explored the relationship
between CEO incentives and multinational corporations (MNCs) for-
eign market expansion decisions (e.g., Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann,
2009; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991; Jaw & Lin, 2009; Levy,
2005; Su, Fan, & Rao-Nicholson, 2017). For example, Musteen, Datta,
and Herrmann (2009) show that CEOs are more likely to select
full-control entry modes as the proportion of their compensation that
is tied to firm long-term performance increases. Similarly, Woo (2019)
finds that CEO equity-based compensation is positively related to the
likelihood that new ventures internationalize early. The view that has
emerged from this literature is that internationalization decisions can
be explained by CEO incentives that are designed by the board and
HRM professionals (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007; Gomez-Mejia,
Wiseman, & Johnson, 2005).
Although this stream of research has produced important insights,
little is known about how the embeddedness of the CEO in a particu-
lar social or institutional context influence foreign market expansion
decisions in response to incentives. In fact, the literature on the effect
of CEO incentives on MNC internationalization decisions has devel-
oped almost independently from a large body of research that con-
siders how institutional forces influence MNCs' foreign market entry
mode decisions (e.g., Salomon & Wu, 2012; Yiu & Makino, 2002). Spe-
cifically, while HRM scholars have primarily focused on studying how
CEO incentives influence the choice between, for example, full control
or shared control entry modes (e.g., Musteen et al., 2009), institutional
scholars have shown that MNCs often succumb to host country institu-
tional pressures when expanding abroad (e.g., Ang, Benischke, & Doh,
2015; Lu, 2002). This has resulted in an incomplete understanding of
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how CEO incentive structures influence MNCs' internationalization
strategies. An important yet unanswered question is: Do CEO incen-
tives influence how the firm responds to institutional pressure in for-
eign market entry mode decisions? This question is all the more critical
considering that prior research has started to document that MNCs do,
in fact, increasingly deviate from local norms; but we lack insight into
why deviations arise (e.g., Regner & Edman, 2014).
In this study, we seek to address the aforementioned question by
combining insights from institutional theory in its sociological form
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and the most recent HRM literature explor-
ing CEO incentives using behavioral agency literature (e.g., Martin,
Washburn, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 2015; Martin, Wiseman, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2016; Zolotoy, O'Sullivan, Martin, & Veeraraghavan, 2018). In
particular, we argue that equity incentives influence CEO responses to
institutional pressures in MNCs foreign market expansion decisions;
yet that these incentives are not always consistent with institutional
conformance pressures. Our guiding premise is based on predictions
from the behavioral agency model (BAM; Denya, Gomez-Mejia,
DeCastro, & Wiseman, 2005; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998),
suggesting that loss averse CEOs take less risk as they accumulate
equity wealth. In the context of our study, this insight suggests that
CEOs weigh the potential losses of current personal wealth when mak-
ing foreign market entry mode decisions, suppressing the perceived
need to conform to institutional norms. In other words, we propose
that CEOs' concern for the preservation of equity wealth can make
them less likely to conform to local institutional norms, and this influ-
ences their foreign expansion decisions.
We test our hypotheses by analyzing the impact of CEO incen-
tives on decisions regarding equity ownership alternatives in cross-
border acquisitions. This context allows us to operationalize institu-
tional pressures and observe CEO responses to both institutional
pressure (Chan & Makino, 2007) and their incentives. As such, our
empirical context also connects with a stream of HRM research
exploring the role of CEO incentives in acquisition activities (Rich &
Bush, 1987), including cross-border acquisition integration challenges
(Bagdadli, Hayton, & Perfido, 2014; Khan, Rao-Nicholson, Akhtar, &
He, in press) and implications of cross-border acquisitions for HRM
systems (e.g., Cooke & Huang, 2011; Yahiaoui, Chebbi, &
Weber, 2016).
Based on the analysis of 4,184 cross-border acquisitions, we find
general support for the prediction that foreign market entry decisions
result from a combination of both CEO incentives and institutional
norms. The literature on compensation strategy goes back a few
decades (e.g., Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987, 1990; Gomez-Mejia,
1992; Gomez-Mejia, McCann, & Page, 1985), yet most of this
research has circumvented the issue of foreign expansion decisions in
response to institutional pressures and the focus has generally been
restricted to the effect of CEO incentives on the choice between a
given set of entry modes. Our study shifts the theoretical focus to
studying how CEO incentives influence MNC's conformance strate-
gies. Specifically, our study suggests that CEO incentives can lead to
less institutional conformity when MNCs are expanding abroad. This
perspective not only contrasts prior findings that CEO incentives may
reinforce existing institutional norms (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009)
but also draws attention to an interesting decision-making dilemma to
which HRM researchers have paid limited attention: under which con-
ditions are CEOs willing to trade personal benefits for firm-level legiti-
macy gains? By doing so, our study also adds a new dimension to the
emerging stream of literature (e.g., Rathert, 2016; Regner & Edman,
2014; Tsui & Moellering, 2010) that seeks to explain heterogeneous
MNC responses to institutional pressures—instead of conformance
strategies—by introducing a CEO-centric (HRM) explanation of devia-
tions from the norm.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES
The role of the CEO has long been of interest to HRM professionals
and academics (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, &
Hinkin, 1987; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007; Patel, Li, Triana, &
Park, 2018). Within this literature, two dominant research streams can
be identified (Koyuncu, Hamori, & Baruch, 2017; Wang, Holmes,
Oh, & Zhu, 2016). One set of literature has focused on the effect of
CEO demographic characteristics on firm outcomes, including interna-
tionalization decisions. These studies are mainly grounded in upper
echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and argue that CEO char-
acteristics direct the attention, selection and interpretation of envi-
ronmental stimuli which should in return be reflected in the firm's
internationalization decisions (e.g., Benson, Perez-Nordtvedt, & Datta,
2009; Herrmann & Datta, 2006; Isidor, Schwens, & Kabst, 2011;
Jaw & Lin, 2009; Kunisch, Menz, & Cannella Jr., 2019; Le & Kroll,
2017; Su et al., 2017). Another stream in the HRM literature has
examined how CEO incentives influence internationalization deci-
sions. Most of these studies adopt an agency perspective, suggesting
that CEO incentives can explain strategic risk taking behavior—and
therefore firm internationalization decisions (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 1988;
Musteen et al., 2009; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Woo, 2019). In par-
ticular, these studies tend to argue that increases in equity compensa-
tion align the CEO's risk preference with those of shareholders,
resulting in the adoption of higher risk entry modes (e.g., Hou, Li, &
Priem, 2013; Musteen et al., 2009).
Yet, while prior HRM literature has clearly demonstrated the
important role of CEO incentives in influencing firms' strategic
choices, including foreign market expansion strategies, most of these
studies have paid limited attention to the social or institutional con-
text in which these decisions are made (Zolotoy et al., 2018). This is,
among others, reflected in the dominant approach in prior HRM litera-
ture to link CEO incentives to the choice between a given set of for-
eign market entry modes (e.g., Musteen et al., 2009). This approach,
however, is problematic because prior research studying MNC strategy
through an institutional lens has documented the influence of institu-
tional pressures on MNCs' internationalization strategies. For example,
Yiu and Makino (2002) show that host country institutions influence
MNCs' entry mode decision (see also Ang et al., 2015; Powell & Rhee,
2016; Xia, Tan, & Tan, 2008). In this regard, institutional scholars
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emphasize MNCs need to adopt strategies that are “taken-for-granted”
and thus acceptable within a particular institutional field (Zimmerman &
Zeitz, 2002; Zucker, 1977). Deviations from these institutionally pre-
scribed action patterns (non-conformity) are punished with the loss of
legitimacy (e.g., Grossman & Schoenfeld, 2001).
While this stream of research suggests that CEOs should indeed
have an interest to adopt conformance strategies when expanding
abroad, there is strong evidence showing that MNCs increasingly
deviate from host country norms (e.g., Bae, Chen, & Lawler, 1998;
Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016;
Holm, Decreton, Nell, & Klopf, 2017; Regner & Edman, 2014). One
possible explanation for this observation—one that has also implicitly
been acknowledged by neoinstitutional theorists (Meyer & Rowan,
1977)—is that while the pursuit of isomorphic (or conformance) strat-
egies may indeed reduce legitimacy risk, such strategies may at the
same time increase firm-specific business risk.1 That is, while we do
not assume that legitimacy and business risk are always asymmetrical,
previous work documents that CEOs are often confronted with
decision-situations in which legitimacy risk reduction may be achieved
at the expense of an increase in business risk; hence, they must man-
age the tension between legitimacy and business risk (Barreto &
Baden-Fuller, 2006; Chung & Luo, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Reusen & Stouthuysen, 2017; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997).
Legitimacy risk reduction may increase firm-specific business risk
for various reasons. First, the adoption of isomorphic strategies can
have a negative impact on firm performance as firms pursuing isomor-
phic strategies may forego opportunities that are more lucrative
(Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006). Second, the pursuit of isomorphic
strategies in response to institutional pressures could engender busi-
ness risks because firms may adopt strategies that are incompatible
with current organizational structures or culture (Reusen & Stout-
huysen, 2017; Westphal et al., 1997). Third, conformity may pose a
threat to a firm's financial performance if the strategy adopted in
response to institutional pressures is an inherently higher risk than
the alternatives (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006). Forth, once an iso-
morphic strategy is adopted, this constrains the exploration of other
alternatives due to the consumption of specific resources (sunk
costs) involved; the magnitude and specificity of the resource com-
mitment to an isomorphic path makes it difficult to reallocate or
replace those resources in the future to pursue practice variation.
This can expose the firm to greater business risk if it limits its adap-
tive capability or the discretion to respond to emerging environmen-
tal opportunities.
HRM scholars studying the effect of CEO incentives on MNCs
foreign expansion strategies, however, have largely neglected the
notion that CEOs may be confronted with situations in which legiti-
macy risk reduction may be achieved at the expense of an increase
in business risk. While this omission is not surprising given that
those literatures have evolved independently from each other, the
persistence of this gap results in an incomplete picture of the effect
of CEO incentives on MNCs foreign market entry mode decisions.
Specifically, previous work tends to neglect that conformance
decisions when expanding abroad also have implications for CEO
equity wealth. However, given the inter-relationship between CEO
firm-specific equity wealth and firm share price performance
(Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010), there is the possibil-
ity that the magnitude to which legitimacy reduction threatens the
CEO's firm-specific equity wealth (through an increase in business
risk) may determine their willingness to conform to host country
institutional pressures. In other words, integrating insights from the
HRM literature on the effect of CEO incentives on MNC strategy
and research studying MNC strategy through an institutional lens,
an important yet unanswered question emerges: What is the effect
of CEO incentives on their responses to institutional host country
pressures? In order to address this question, we next review BAM
and institutional literature.
2.1 | BAM and responses to institutional pressures
BAM infused traditional agency theory with the findings derived from
behavioral decision research with the objective of improving our ability
to predict the risk taking behavior of managerial agents (Gomez-Mejia,
Larraza-Kintana Moyano, & Firfiray, 2017; Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, &
Wiseman, 2000; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). For instance, BAM
replaced agency theory's assumption of a managerial agent that is risk
averse with the assumption that the agent is loss averse. This derives
from prospect theory's concept of loss aversion, based on the insight
that individuals will avoid risk when faced with a certain gain (risk aver-
sion), yet they will take additional risk in order to avoid impending
losses to endowed wealth (risk seeking) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Moreover, BAM suggests that the CEO's perceived wealth-at-risk
(or risk bearing) mediates the influence of CEO loss aversion upon risk
taking, leading to the prediction that CEO risk bearing and risk taking
are negatively related (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Behavioral
agency research has also increasingly been leveraged in the HRM litera-
ture to explain CEO manipulation of firm business risk (using strategic
levers: Benischke et al., 2019; Gomez-Mejia, Neacsu, & Martin, 2019;
Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013, Martin et al., 2015; Zolotoy
et al., 2018) to limit risk of personal wealth loss; yet this research has
not considered the legitimacy risks associated with strategic decisions.
Below, we integrate behavioral agency with institutional theory to
examine how the CEO is likely to respond to business risk when making
decisions in response to institutional pressure.
2.1.1 | CEO incentives and institutional
conformance
Neoinstitutional theory is built on the notion that firms will succumb
to institutional pressures to increase legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan,
1977). As noted above, a reduction of firm-level legitimacy risk
through enhancing legitimacy, however, may in some situations be
hindered by an increase in business risk that could negate the net firm
risk reduction that the CEO would achieve through institutional con-
formance. Hence, the CEO may have to consider the business risk of
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conformance when assessing the consequences of conformance for
their personal wealth (Merriman & Deckop, 2007). Specifically, in the
context of this study, we argue that acquiring an equity stake in cross-
border acquisitions similar to those acquired by prior market entrants
(i.e., lower deviation from the industry norm) due to institutional pres-
sures increases business risk for several reasons.2
First, firms that conform to institutional pressures when deciding
upon the equity stake in a target, may be confronted with greater
acquisition costs given the greater sunk costs associated with such
deals (Slangen, 2013). Thus, in the context of cross-border acquisition
strategies, if institutional pressures require the acquirer to take a
given equity stake in the local target, the reduction of legitimacy risk
often comes with higher business risk for the firm due to higher sunk
costs that cannot easily be recovered. Second, firms that conform to
institutional pressures when deciding upon the equity stake in a
target, are also at a greater risk of misevaluation, and specifically,
overvaluation of the target firm (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, &
Viswanathan, 2005), resulting in a lower likelihood that synergies
can be achieved. This argument is consistent with the notion that
high institutional pressures lead the remaining firms to “collectively
bid up the prices of the remaining targets” (McNamara, Haleblian, &
Dykes, 2008, p. 116). Lastly, while some of the factors determining
the optimal equity stake are country- or industry-specific, idiosyn-
cratic firm-level characteristics have been shown to be particularly
consequential (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Therefore, in any given
host country, the optimal equity stake in a target in cross-border
acquisitions differs across MNCs, depending on firm-level factors
such as international experience and R&D intensity (Zhao, Luo, &
Suh, 2004). Conformance decisions can, therefore, create perfor-
mance risk because these conformance decisions are primarily based
on external institutional forces, thereby often resulting in suboptimal
equity stake decisions that may not be best suited to exploit idiosyn-
cratic firm-specific advantages (Harzing, 2002).
As suggested by prior HRM literature (e.g., Brandes, Dharwadkar, &
Das, 2005), CEOs are likely to consider the legitimacy and business
risks associated with cross-border acquisitions when considering the
threat that these transactions may create to their firm. Hence, when
legitimacy is earned through acquiring an equity stake in the foreign
target that does not deviate from the industry norm, and this legitimacy
(or reduction in legitimacy risk) can increase business risk (Gomez-
Mejia & Palich, 1997; Palich & Gomez-Mejia, 1999), CEOs have a
dilemma. The CEO can decide to: (a) reduce legitimacy risk through tak-
ing the equity stake demanded by institutional norms (low deviation
from the industry norm), or to (b) reduce business risk through deviating
from the norm by taking a different equity stake in the foreign target
than the industry norm. Given BAM suggests that CEOs with greater
risk bearing will avoid strategic decisions that jeopardize their firm-
specific equity wealth, we suggest that the CEO's level of risk bearing
(equity wealth-at-risk of loss) will determine the degree to which they
are willing to deviate from the industry norm when deciding upon the
equity stake taken in a foreign target. Specifically, we expect that,
despite potential firm-level legitimacy benefits, CEOs with greater
levels of risk bearing tend to avoid increasing business risk and, hence,
are more likely to deviate from the industry norm. This is because
increases in business risk translate into a greater personal risk of loss
for those CEOs whose personal wealth is tied to the performance of
the focal firm through equity grants (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Said differently, accepting greater business risk in return for a legiti-
macy risk reduction also increases the personal risk of loss for the CEO
as their equity risk bearing increases.3
In sum, because CEOs with greater levels of risk bearing are more
likely to be motivated to reduce firm risk to preserve that wealth
(Benischke et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2015) they
should be less prone to conform to institutional pressures that
increase business risk despite the possibility of legitimacy gains. This
leads to our prediction that CEOs are more likely to deviate from the
industry norm (such as the equity stake taken in cross-border acquisi-
tions by prior acquirers) as their equity wealth (equity risk bearing)
increases.
Hypothesis 1 CEO equity risk bearing will increase the deviation
from the industry norm when deciding on the equity stake
taken in a foreign target.
So far, we have assumed that CEOs have full discretion over the
degree of legitimacy risk they are willing to accept in exchange for a
reduction in business risk. However, in its original formulation, institu-
tional theory leaves little room for such managerial discretion
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While subsequent work has relaxed this
notion (Cantwell et al., 2010; Regner & Edman, 2014), there is most
likely variation in the degree to which CEOs have discretion to deviate
from the norm when deciding upon the equity stake taken in a foreign
target. Here, we focus on two particularly important host country
characteristics that may influence CEOs ability to deviate from the
norm in order to reduce business risk when expanding abroad through
cross-border acquisitions: host country governance quality and cul-
tural tightness/looseness.
2.1.2 | Governance quality, CEO risk preferences,
and institutional conformance
Host country governance quality refers to the quality of a given host
country's governance infrastructure (Slangen & van Tulder, 2009),
which is defined as a host countries set of “public institutions and pol-
icies created by governments as a framework for economic, legal, and
social relations” (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003, p. 20). It includes (a) the
process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced;
(b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and imple-
ment sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among
them (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 4).
We argue that in host countries with a higher quality of gover-
nance infrastructure, CEO's discretion to deviate from the norm is
lower. Said differently, in host countries characterized by high levels
of governance quality, there is greater enforcement of institutional
4 BENISCHKE ET AL.
norms (Waguespack, Dunford, & Birnir, 2018) and MNCs, therefore,
have less opportunity to deviate from the norm without risking severe
social penalties (Cantwell et al., 2010). This is because, in host coun-
tries characterized by high levels of governance quality, the overall
adaptability of the local institutional system is very low. As a result,
the local institutional system leaves little room to accommodate strat-
egies that are inconsistent with local norms, thereby creating an envi-
ronment that highly favors—and enforces—conformance strategies
(Westney, 1993). In such a context, MNCs have a strong incentive to
achieve a high fit with the local institutional environment and CEOs
with high levels of equity risk bearing have thus limited opportunities
to reduce business risk in exchange for an increase in legitimacy risk.
That is, CEOs with high levels of equity risk bearing should face more
difficulties deviating from institutional norms in host countries with
stronger governance given expectations of conformity toward foreign
MNCs are higher (Regner & Edman, 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize
the following:
Hypothesis 2 The likelihood that increases in CEO equity risk bearing
lead to deviations from the industry norm when deciding on
the equity stake taken in a foreign target is weaker in host
countries with high governance quality.
2.1.3 | Cultural tightness, CEO risk incentives and
institutional conformance
While governance quality captures the formal aspect of a host coun-
try's institutional environment (Ang et al., 2015), the informal element
is, in part, reflected in the host country's national culture (Gomez-
Mejia, 1984; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997). National culture has long
been postulated as a salient variable in MNCs entry mode decisions
including equity stake choices in cross-border acquisitions
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). In this
regard, building on related work in anthropology (Pelto, 1968), sociol-
ogy (Boldt, 1978), and psychology (Berry, 1967; Carpenter, 2000,
Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver (2006) introduced the concept of societal
tightness/looseness. In contrast to competing frameworks such as the
cultural values framework (Hofstede, 1980), the concept of cultural
tightness/looseness explicitly considers the influence of societal
norms and the degree of sanctioning within societies (Gelfand et al.,
2006; Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007). While values and norms are
often used indiscriminately, the concepts are indeed distinct (Gelfand
et al., 2011). Whereas values are located at the individual level, norms
are located at the societal level (Leung & Morris, 2015). To integrate
the notion of norms as well as the idea of sanctioning, the conceptual
focus is on the distinction between cultures that can be described as
“loose” versus those that are considered to be more “tight.”
This distinction between loose and tight cultures captures the
degree to which societies are characterized by weak (strong) norms
and tolerance for deviant behavior from these norms. Building on
these ideas, we suggest that in host countries with tight national cul-
tures, foreign MNCs, and their CEOs have less flexibility in the
decision to deviate from the norm—even though the CEO may have
an incentive to do so due to high equity risk bearing. This is because
societies that are considered to be tight (loose) are characterized
by strong (weak) norms and relatively low (high) tolerance for devi-
ant behavior. In other words, people in societies characterized by
cultural tightness have been socialized in environments that
strongly encourage conformance to local norms (Chua, Roth, &
Lemoine, 2014; Toh & Leonardelli, 2012); those that deviate are
often confronted with severe punishments. In support of this con-
jecture, Gelfand et al. (2006:1236) also reason that strong isomor-
phic pressures for organizations in tight societies may explain the
dominance of homogenous organizational forms. In addition,
Crossland and Hambrick (2011) show that in loose cultures, CEOs
have more discretion. Thus, even though CEOs with high levels of
equity risk bearing may have an incentive to accept greater legiti-
macy risk in exchange for a reduction in business risk, they may
have less opportunity to do so because the social costs of devia-
tion would outweigh potential benefits. We, therefore, propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The likelihood that increases in CEO equity risk bearing
lead to deviations from the industry norm when deciding on
the equity stake taken in a foreign target is stronger in host
countries characterized by tight national cultures.
3 | METHODOLOGY
Our sample consists of cross-border acquisitions announced by
U.S. MNCs from 1993 to 2016. Studying the effect of institutional
pressures on the equity stake MNCs are acquiring in foreign target
firms is not unprecedented (Chan & Makino, 2007) and thus provides
a suitable context to test our theoretical framework. In fact, prior
studies have consistently emphasized that ownership decisions may
be a means of conformity to foreign institutional fields (e.g., Ang et al.,
2015; Chan & Makino, 2007; Guillén, 2002). As a starting point, we
identified all cross-border acquisitions announced by S&P 1,500 com-
panies. We focus on the S&P 1,500 since these firms are also covered
in the Execucomp database on which we relied to gather data on CEO
compensation. We applied four additional sampling filters. First, we
have excluded all cross-border acquisitions by firms in the Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate category (SIC 60–69) because these firms
often engage in cross-border acquisitions for non-strategic reasons.
Second, we excluded cross-border acquisitions of remaining stakes as
our theory is most relevant in explaining initial stakes taken by the
acquirer (Chan & Makino, 2007). Third, we exclude cross-border
acquisitions with equity stakes under 10% equity as these represent
portfolio investments in which foreign investors merely acquire
equity in a foreign-based firm without effective control or at least
meaningful influence over the acquired firm's decision making
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018).
Fourth, we included only completed acquisitions rather than acquisi-
tions that were announced but not completed. Data on acquisitions
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has been collected from SDC Platinum. CEO compensation data has
been extracted from Execucomp, and firm-level financial data was
collected from COMPUSTAT. After accounting for missing data, our
sample consists of 4,184 cross-border acquisitions that have been
announced by 1,065 unique firms.
3.1 | Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our study is the deviation from the industry
norm in the equity stake the U.S.-based MNC acquired in the foreign
firm. To measure this variable, we first need to define the industry
norm. Drawing on related work in institutional theory, we defined the
relevant institutional field at the host country-industry level (Ang et al.,
2015). While MNCs may face fragmented institutional fields (Kostova,
Roth, & Dacin, 2008), previous work has demonstrated that MNCs are
most likely to respond to pressures emanating from firms within the
target host country industry as opposed to the behavior of all firms (Xia
et al., 2008). We have therefore focused on other foreign MNCs' equity
stake decisions as a reference group (Ang et al., 2015). It is also likely
that institutional pressures stemming from the behavior of other firms
in the same industry within the same country is strongest for more
recent behavior (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000). Thus, we measure the indus-
try norm as the average ownership stake taken by other foreign MNCs
in the same host country, in the same target firm industry (at the two-
digit SIC level), in the 3-year period prior to the transaction (see the
endogeneity and robustness tests section for alternative approaches
we have considered when defining the industry norm).
Acquiring an equity stake in the foreign target firm that does not
deviate from the industry norm is an isomorphic choice to lower legiti-
macy risk; conversely, acquiring an equity stake in the foreign target
firm that deviates from the industry norm is a non-isomorphic choice
that increases legitimacy risk. Therefore, we compute our dependent
variable, equity stake deviation, as the absolute difference between the
industry norm and the equity stake taken by the U.S.-based MNC in
the foreign firm.
3.2 | Independent variable
3.2.1 | CEO risk bearing
To measure the degree to which personal risk to the CEO influences
deviations from the industry norm, we focus on CEO equity risk bear-
ing. Consistent with prior research examining CEO firm-specific equity
risk bearing (e.g., Benischke et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2013), we use a
variable labeled CEO equity that captures the combined cash value of
the CEO's exercisable options and unexercisable options to capture
equity risk bearing. The cash value of exercisable and unexercisable
options is calculated by multiplying the number of options by their
corresponding spread (for in-the-money) options at fiscal year-end
(Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Martin et al., 2013).
This variable is measured at t − 1.
3.3 | Moderating variables
To test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, we need to examine if the
deviations from the industry norm are influenced by host country gov-
ernance and cultural tightness/looseness. Following prior research
(e.g., Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009),
we use the average score of the World Bank's six governance dimen-
sions to measure host country governance quality. As noted above, the
World Bank governance indicators consist of six dimensions: voice
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al.,
2010). For each dimension, every country covered in the database
receives a score that ranges from −2.5 to 2.5, with lower (higher)
values indicating a lower (higher) governance quality. We use the
average score of the six dimensions to calculate a composite measure
of host country governance quality. To test Hypothesis 2, we interact
this variable with the CEO equity variable.
To measure cultural tightness/looseness, we use the measure
developed by Gelfand et al. (2011). This measure captures “the differ-
ence between nations that are ‘tight’—have strong norms and low tol-
erance of deviant behavior—and those that are ‘loose’—have weak
norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior” (Gelfand et al., 2011,
p. 1100). Hence, the tightness score captures the pressure for confor-
mance to social institutional norms in the host country. To do this, we
use the tightness score, termed cultural tightness in our study, to mea-
sure the social pressure in the host country to comply with equity
stake norms. To test Hypothesis 3, we interact this variable with the
CEO equity variable.
3.4 | Control variables
In order to rule out alternative explanations, we control for a number
of variables at the country, firm, transaction, and CEO level that can
affect the stake taken by acquirers in cross-border acquisitions. We
control for the size of each host market through host country GDP and
the level of economic development of each host market through host
country GDP per capita (e.g., Slangen, 2013). Given our research con-
text, it is also important to control for the existence of investment
restrictions. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Slangen, 2013) we
control for elements of the political host country institutional environ-
ment not covered by our moderating variable using two different vari-
ables. First, we control for investment restrictions. This variable is
based on survey data included in IMD's World Competitiveness Year-
book. Specifically, we include the average responses to the statement
“Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies.”
This variable can take a value from 0 to 10, whereby a higher value
indicates fewer investment restrictions. We thus reverse coded this
variable to capture the degree to which foreign investors face invest-
ment restrictions. Second, we use the Political Constraint Index
(Henisz, 2000) to control for host country political risk. This variable
can take any value between 0 and 1, whereby a higher value indicates
less political risk. We thus reverse coded this variable in order to
6 BENISCHKE ET AL.
capture the degree to which foreign investors face political risks. We
further control for geographic distance, measured as the great-circle
distance in kilometers between the capital cities of the home and host
countries.
We also control for elements of the social host country institu-
tional environment not covered by our moderating variable using two
different variables. First, we control for cultural distance. Our measure
of cultural distance is based on Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimensions
and the Kogut and Singh (1988) formula to calculate our cultural dis-
tance measure. Second, we control for whether or not the target
nation has a common official language with the acquirer nation using
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if both nations share an
official language, and zero if otherwise.
At the transaction level, we include a dummy variable control-
ling for the relatedness of the transaction. Diversification is coded
as one if the acquisition target firm comes from a different SIC-2
industry, and zero if otherwise. We control for the deal attitude
using a dummy variable; acquisition is friendly, that takes the value
of one if the deal was classified as friendly in SDC, and zero if oth-
erwise. To capture the effect of the payment method we use a
dummy variable, cash payment, that is coded as one if 95% or more
of the transaction is paid in cash, and zero if otherwise. We also
controlled for two target firm characteristics. First, we captured
whether another firm divested the acquisition target. Divestiture
was coded as a dummy variable taking the value of one if another
firm divested the acquisition target, and zero if otherwise. Second,
we also included a dummy variable taking the value of one if the
target is publicly listed, and zero if otherwise.
To control for firm-level effects, we have included variables that
capture firm size, R&D intensity, and performance at t − 1. Firm size is
measured as the logarithm of total assets and R&D intensity as R&D
spending in relation to total assets. Performance is measured using
the market-based measure Tobin's Q. We measured Tobin's Q as fol-
lows: ([Closing share price * common shares outstanding] + total
assets − total common equity)/total assets (Cai & Vijh, 2007).4 We
also include a number of variables that capture the experience and
associated isomorphic pressures the MNC may be exposed to. First,
we control for host country acquisition experience. Host country
acquisition experience is measured as the number of completed full
acquisitions (over 95% equity stake) in the same host country in the
three-year period prior to the transaction. Similarly, we have also
controlled for overall full acquisition experience measured as the
number of completed full acquisitions conducted in a 3-year period
prior to the focal transaction. Finally, we control for the average past
equity stake taken in all past acquisitions.5
Lastly, we control for a number of CEO level effects. We control
for CEO age (in years) given that older CEOs may be more risk-averse
(Musteen et al., 2009). To account for variance in home country com-
pensation norms across industries we include the average total com-
pensation of all CEOs listed in the Execucomp database measured at
the four-digit SIC level as industry average compensation. We further
control for factors that may determine the CEO's power over the
board. First, we control for CEO tenure (in months) in light of evidence
that longer-tenured CEOs have greater influence over the board
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Second, board-chair CEOs are also
expected to be in a better position to advance and endorse personal
preferences (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991); we, therefore, control for
CEO duality. CEO duality is measured as a dummy variable that is
coded as one if the CEO also serves as chairman, and zero if other-
wise. We have also included two control variables related to the
CEO's compensation. CEO restricted stock was measured as the aggre-
gated cash value of the CEO's restricted stock holdings at fiscal year-
end. CEO cash compensation is measured as the sum of cash payments
and bonuses the CEO has received. Both CEO compensation control
variables are measured at t − 1. We also include year dummies, with
1993 being the omitted value.
4 | RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. It
is noteworthy that the equity stake deviation varies from 0 to 90%
indicating that some firms deviate strongly from the industry norm.6
In our sample, the average equity stake acquirers take in foreign tar-
gets is 93.98% (SD 18.43%) (compared to 87% [SD 26%] in a study by
Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015 and 89% [SD 24%] in a study by
Chari & Chang, 2009). The slightly higher average equity stake
acquirers take in foreign targets may be explained by our focus on
U.S. firms, whereas other studies have focused on an international
sample (Cuypers et al., 2015) or also included financial services firms
(Chari & Chang, 2009). Interestingly, we also observe that there is a
significant increase in the equity stake taken in foreign targets over
the duration of our sample period. The difference between the aver-
age equity stake in 1993 and 2016 is 7.61 percentage points. A t test
confirmed that this difference is unlikely to be zero (t[266] = 3.333,
p = .001). Thus, the higher average equity stake in our sample may be
because our sample includes relatively more recent observations, a
finding that is consistent with Chari and Chang (2009) who also find
an increasing trend in the share of equity sought. Finally, as noted
above, we excluded deals with less than 10% equity because they are
considered portfolio investments rather than Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI). Hence, the average and SD in our study are calculated
without very low equity stakes.
As can be seen, there are some relatively large correlations
between the host country governance and other institutional vari-
ables. To further analyze these correlations, we have run post-
regression collinearity diagnostics. It has been suggested that the
threshold for serious multicollinearity is a variance inflation factor
(VIF) of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, p. 423). Our post-
regression multicollinearity diagnostics demonstrate that the VIF
for all first-order variables is below this threshold with a mean VIF
of 2.66 and a highest individual VIF of 8.20 (for the host country
governance variable). If we drop the host country GDP per capita
variable (it has the second-highest individual VIF of 8.06) from the
analysis the mean VIF becomes 2.19, the VIF for the host country
governance variable becomes 3.27, and the results remain very
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TABLE 2 Regression results CEO equity on equity stake deviation
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Constant 14.710 16.291 17.373 16.487 17.441 16.530
(6.178) (6.219) (6.604) (6.510) (6.636) (6.557)
[0.017] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.012]
Host country GDP 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.117] [0.116] [0.295] [0.360] [0.305] [0.369]
Host country GDP per capita −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.746] [0.725] [0.746] [0.724]
Investment restrictions 0.337 0.333 −0.450 −0.486 −0.457 −0.491
(0.388) (0.386) (0.380) (0.378) (0.379) (0.378)
[0.385] [0.389] [0.237] [0.199] [0.228] [0.194]
Host country political risk −0.097 −0.070 −2.193 −2.269 −2.245 −2.300
(1.884) (1.875) (2.001) (1.988) (2.010) (2.012)
[0.959] [0.970] [0.273] [0.254] [0.264] [0.253]
Geographic distance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cultural distance 2.882 2.877 1.639 1.637 1.647 1.642
(0.338) (0.337) (0.357) (0.359) (0.357) (0.361)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Common official language −1.374 −1.401 −2.600 −2.653 −2.586 −2.645
(0.708) (0.711) (0.741) (0.740) (0.747) (0.747)
[0.053] [0.049] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Diversification −0.124 −0.146 −0.153 −0.106 −0.149 −0.104
(0.445) (0.447) (0.440) (0.435) (0.441) (0.436)
[0.781] [0.743] [0.728] [0.807] [0.735] [0.811]
Acquisition is friendly −14.966 −14.756 −14.543 −13.772 −14.563 −13.786
(3.752) (3.652) (3.600) (3.538) (3.605) (3.549)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cash payment −0.715 −0.744 −0.723 −0.709 −0.720 −0.708
(0.519) (0.517) (0.515) (0.514) (0.514) (0.514)
[0.169] [0.151] [0.160] [0.168] [0.162] [0.169]
Divestiture −2.286 −2.265 −2.260 −2.240 −2.262 −2.242
(0.450) (0.448) (0.444) (0.442) (0.444) (0.442)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Target is public 2.471 2.571 2.674 2.696 2.670 2.694
(1.720) (1.715) (1.744) (1.745) (1.745) (1.747)
[0.151] [0.134] [0.125] [0.123] [0.126] [0.123]
Firm size 0.843 0.797 0.731 0.751 0.730 0.751
(0.189) (0.189) (0.191) (0.189) (0.192) (0.190)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tobin's Q 0.055 0.002 0.012 −0.003 0.013 −0.002
(0.096) (0.074) (0.078) (0.071) (0.078) (0.071)
[0.564] [0.981] [0.878] [0.967] [0.863] [0.978]
(Continues)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
R&D intensity 0.036 0.028 0.058 0.066 0.057 0.065
(0.123) (0.130) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126) (0.125)
[0.769] [0.830] [0.643] [0.597] [0.653] [0.603]
Host country acquisition experience −0.150 −0.179 −0.164 −0.179 −0.162 −0.178
(0.290) (0.290) (0.285) (0.286) (0.285) (0.286)
[0.605] [0.537] [0.564] [0.532] [0.569] [0.535]
Acquisition experience −0.201 −0.184 −0.164 −0.156 −0.164 −0.156
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.085)
[0.019] [0.031] [0.053] [0.068] [0.052] [0.067]
Average past equity stake −0.020 −0.020 −0.021 −0.022 −0.021 −0.022
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
[0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
CEO duality 0.591 0.626 0.683 0.654 0.683 0.654
(0.488) (0.481) (0.477) (0.474) (0.477) (0.474)
[0.226] [0.194] [0.153] [0.168] [0.153] [0.168]
CEO tenure (months) −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.675] [0.422] [0.420] [0.536] [0.419] [0.536]
CEO age (years) −0.024 −0.021 −0.024 −0.025 −0.024 −0.025
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
[0.497] [0.550] [0.490] [0.462] [0.488] [0.461]
Industry average compensation 1.274 1.118 1.180 1.168 1.179 1.168
(0.415) (0.411) (0.407) (0.407) (0.408) (0.407)
[0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CEO restricted stock −0.153 −0.180 −0.127 −0.128 −0.127 −0.128
(0.280) (0.281) (0.274) (0.260) (0.275) (0.261)
[0.585] [0.523] [0.643] [0.622] [0.645] [0.623]
CEO cash compensation 0.115 −0.044 −0.101 −0.062 −0.101 −0.062
(0.339) (0.361) (0.360) (0.357) (0.361) (0.357)
[0.735] [0.902] [0.779] [0.862] [0.779] [0.862]
CEO equity 0.667 0.681 2.492 0.422 2.334
(0.321) (0.306) (0.647) (0.886) (0.954)
[0.038] [0.026] [0.000] [0.634] [0.015]
Host country governance −5.347 −5.293 −5.355 −5.298
(1.337) (1.320) (1.339) (1.323)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cultural tightness 0.954 0.965 0.952 0.964
(0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CEO equity × host country governance −1.716 −1.713
(0.486) (0.483)
[0.000] [0.000]
CEO equity × cultural tightness 0.042 0.025
(0.132) (0.126)
[0.752] [0.842]
(Continues)
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similar. Hence, we take a more conservative approach and retain
the variable in the analysis (full results available upon request).
The results of the hypotheses tests are presented in Table 2.
Model 1 of Table 2 is the baseline model including only control vari-
ables. Model 2 introduces the CEO equity variable and shows a signifi-
cant positive (b = .667, p = .038) effect on equity stake deviation. This
suggests that the risk-bearing inherent to CEO equity increases the
deviation from the industry norm when deciding on the equity stake
taken in a foreign target. Regarding effect size, when CEO equity com-
pensation increases by 1 SD from the mean, the deviation from the
industry norm increases from 13.86 percentage points to 14.53 per-
centage points. Hence, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Model 3 of Table 2 introduces the two moderating variables.
Model 4 introduces the interaction terms used to test Hypothesis
2. The “host country governance × CEO equity” interaction is negative
and significant (b = −1.716, p = .000). In addition, we plot the effect in
Figure 1. It can be seen that as CEO equity compensation increases,
the equity stake deviation decreases when host country governance
increases. The figure also illustrates the effect size. At the mean level of
CEO equity compensation, when host country governance increases by
1 SD from the mean, the deviation from the industry norm decreases
from 13.86 percentage points to 10.94 percentage points. Thus, we
conclude that Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Model 5 introduces the interaction term used to test Hypothe-
sis 3. The “cultural tightness × CEO equity” interaction is positive
but not significant (b = .024, p = .752). Figure 2 illustrates the mod-
erating effect of cultural tightness. It can be seen that as cultural
tightness increases this merely shifts the intercept but does not
alter the relationship between CEO equity compensation and
equity stake deviation. Hypothesis 3 is thus not supported. Model
6 presents the fully specified model and further corroborates our
results from Models 1–5.
With respect to control variables, we interpret the results in the
fully specified Model 6 in Table 2. Interestingly, we find that in more
geographically distant (p = .000) and more culturally distant (p = .000)
host countries firms deviate more from industry norms whereas in
host countries that share an official language (p = .000) with the home
country firms deviate less from industry equity stake norms. This indi-
cates that the social institutional environment may play an important
and diverse role in enforcing industry norms. Of the transaction level
control variables, friendly acquisitions (p = .000) and acquisitions of a
divested unit (p = .000) deviate less from industry norms. In regard to
firm-level control variables, larger firms (p = .000) deviate more from
industry norms while the average past equity stake firms have taken is
negatively (p = .001) associated with deviating from the industry
norm. In addition, higher industry average compensation in the home
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.224 0.225 0.241 0.245 0.241 0.244
F 24.773 24.470 25.187 25.170 24.756 24.742
F p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
df 47 48 50 51 51 52
NR of Obs 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184
Notes: SE adjusted for clustering by acquirer in parentheses. p-Values in brackets. Results are for two-tailed tests. All models included dummy variables for
each year with 1993 as the reference year. Results for year dummies are not included.
F IGURE 2 CEO equity and predicted equity stake deviation for
cultural tightness
F IGURE 1 CEO equity and predicted equity stake deviation for
host country governance
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country is positively (p = .004) associated with deviate more from
industry norms in the host country.
4.1 | Endogeneity and robustness tests
We conduct a number of supplemental analyses to check the robust-
ness of our results (all results are available upon request). First, it is
likely that firms self-select into cross-border acquisition. Thus it is
likely that firms are not randomly assigned to our sample. If this is the
case, and we do not account for this in our estimation, this could lead
to biased estimates (Shaver, 1998). To test if selection influences our
results we use all firms listed in the Compustat database (excluding
financial services firms) to compute the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman,
1979) and then include this ratio to control for selection in our
models. To compute the inverse Mills ratio, we estimate a random
effects probit model. In this model, the dependent variable takes the
value of 1 if a firm announced a cross-border acquisition in a given
year and 0 if otherwise. The independent variables used in this model
are the CEO level control and compensation variables and the firm-
level control variables described above. We also include year dummy
variables.
To identify selection in this model, we need to include an instru-
ment that is correlated with the probability of announcing a cross-
border acquisition, but that is not correlated with the equity deviation
from the industry norm in the host country. The instrumental variable
we use is home country industry concentration measured as the
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (at the two-digit SIC level). We believe
this is a valid instrument because firms engage in acquisitions in gen-
eral (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009) and
internationalization in particular (Shaver, 1998) in response to com-
petitive pressure in the home market. Also, we have no reason to
believe that domestic competitive pressure would influence the equity
stake deviations from the industry norm in a given host country.
When estimating the selection model, all CEO compensation vari-
ables, CEO gender, firms size, and firm performance are significant
predictors. The effect of industry concentration is negative and signifi-
cant (p = .001) in the selection model. In addition, when we include
home country industry concentration in the models presented above,
the effect remains insignificant (p > .05) in all models. Therefore, we are
satisfied that the instrument satisfies exclusion restrictions. When we
re-estimate our models including the inverse Mills ratio, the variable
remains insignificant in all models, but our results remain consistent
with those reported in our main analyses. Hence, we are confident that
self-selection does not influence our results.
One other possible concern with the findings presented here is
that unobservable country, firm, or CEO effects may be introducing
endogeneity leading to biased estimates. To probe this possibility,
we follow Papke and Wooldridge (2008) suggestion to include aver-
age values, an approach known as the Chamberlain-Mundlak device.
This approach is similar to a fixed effects estimator, but rather than
demeaning the data for estimation; the mean values are modeled
explicitly. Specifically, we compute the firm-specific average for
performance, firm size, R&D intensity, host country acquisitions
experience, acquisition experience, and average past equity stake.
We also compute CEO specific averages for CEO duality, CEO ten-
ure, CEO age, and industry average compensation. In addition, we
compute host country specific averages for GDP, GDP per capita,
investment restrictions, and political risk (the other host country
level variables do not vary over time). We re-estimate our models
including these averages and receive very similar results. Post-
estimation analyses do, however, reveal that these models poten-
tially suffer from multicollinearity, and hence we prefer the models
reported in our main analyses.
While we control for a range of host country variables, there may
be unobserved host country characteristics, and there may be differ-
ences in effects across host countries and regions.7 To test for this pos-
sibility, we re-estimate all our models including host country dummy
variables. The results we obtain with this approach are similar to the
results reported above, and only two host countries (Belgium and
France) exhibit a positive and significant coefficient indicating that
these countries differ from the reference category (the United King-
dom) in terms of equity stake deviations. The hypothesized results
remain consistent with those reported in our main analyses. Please
note, however, that post hoc VIF analysis shows that the country
dummy variables are highly correlated with some country level control
variables (geographic distance, cultural distance, and common official
language) and the moderating variables (cultural tightness and host
country governance). Therefore, to further test for country differences,
we re-estimate our models excluding our country level control variables
and using country dummy variables instead. The hypothesized results
are also consistent with those reported in our main analyses. Again,
these results have to be interpreted with caution given that although
this approach reduces collinearity (mean VIF is 18.16), many of the
country control dummies and the moderating variables still exhibit VIFs
that are well above the critical value of 10.
In a similar vein, there may also be some unobserved supra-
regional level differences in decisions to deviate from the norm
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). To test for such regional level differ-
ences, we have created regional dummy variables base on broad
supra-national regions (Europe, Asia, Americas [excluding the United
States as this is the home country], and rest of the world). We have
then included these variables as dummy variables and re-estimated
our models. In this analysis, the Asia dummy variable is positive and
significant in all models indicating that in the Asian region, there are
higher equity stake deviations when compared with Europe while
the other regional dummy variables remain insignificant at conven-
tional levels in all models. Importantly, the results for our main vari-
ables remain consistent across all models.
It is also important to consider that our study period covers the
time of the global financial crisis. To account for the possibility that
the global financial crisis may have affected our results, we also esti-
mate models that include a dummy variable that takes the value of
one for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009, and zero if otherwise. How-
ever, we are unable to include this variable in our analysis because it
is highly correlated to our year dummies. We have therefore re-run
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our analyses without the year dummies and instead re-estimated our
models using the financial crisis dummy variable. When using this
approach, our main results remain consistent with the results pres-
ented above.
Our arguments suggest that CEOs trade-off legitimacy risk and
business risk in equity stake decisions. However, everything else being
equal, acquisitions in which a firm acquires less than 50% of equity
may also be riskier than acquisitions with higher equity stakes because
they do not give full control and may make it more difficult to control
the target firm. To account for the possibility that this effect could
influence our results we drop all deals in which a firm acquired less
than 50% equity. When we re-estimate our models, the results remain
consistent with the results presented here.
Finally, as described above, we define the reference group that
determines the industry norm at the host country-industry level. To
probe how alternative definitions of the reference group affect our
results we test alternative reference periods. First, we use a 2-year
and a 4-year window when calculating the industry norm. Re-
estimating our models with these alternative measures yields similar
results. Second, it may be that the most relevant reference groups are
only firms from the same home country (the United States) rather
than all foreign firm acquisitions. Hence, we re-estimate our models
using only acquisitions by U.S. firms when defining the industry norm.
In these models, the effect for the CEO equity × host country gover-
nance interaction is stronger than the effect reported in the main
analysis (Model 6: b = −2.027; p = .002) while the direct effect of the
CEO equity variable is no longer significant (Model 2: b = 0.446;
p = .250). It could also be assumed that all acquisitions in the host
country (rather than just foreign firm acquisitions) form the relevant
reference group. Accordingly, we re-estimate our models using all
acquisitions in the focal host country when defining the industry norm.
Interestingly, in these models the direct effect of CEO equity is no lon-
ger significant (Model 2: b = .463; p = .134) and the moderating effect
of host country governance becomes weaker (Model 6: b = −0.714;
p = .051). However, the interaction of CEO equity × cultural tightness
now becomes negative and marginally significant (Model 6: b = −.190;
p = .064). In sum, while these alternative specifications of the reference
group generally support the pattern of the results we observe in the
main analyses, they also highlight that it is important to consider alter-
native reference groups.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The objective of this study has been to advance understanding of
how CEO incentives influence their responses to institutional pressure
in foreign market entry decisions. Specifically, we have focused on the
role of managerial agency in response to CEO equity risk bearing
when explaining CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms.
Our results show that MNCs whose CEOs have higher risk bearing
(due to incentives) are more likely to deviate from the industry norm
when deciding upon the equity ownership stake taken in a foreign tar-
get. We further find that this effect is weaker as host country
governance quality increases. We find no statistically significant mod-
erating effect of cultural tightness. Taken together, the pattern of our
results supports our prediction that CEOs with larger equity risk bear-
ing are willing to accept higher legitimacy risk in exchange for lower
levels of business risk (as reflected in the deviation from the industry
norm). We believe that our findings have important implications for
HRM practice and theory.
Most notably, we advance knowledge within the HRM literature
regarding how incentives influence CEO behaviors. Specifically, we
demonstrate that incentives are not sufficient to predict CEO decision
making in the context of foreign market entry decisions. Neither are
institutional factors sufficient to predict these CEO decisions. Indeed,
our findings suggest that both CEO incentives and host country insti-
tutional pressures should be considered when predicting CEO prefer-
ences regarding equity stake decisions in cross-border acquisitions.
While prior HRM research linking CEO incentives to MNC strategy
has conceptualized the entry mode decision as a discrete choice
between a given set of entry modes (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), we
offer an alternative perspective that focuses on the degree to which
CEO incentives explain MNCs likelihood to deviate from industry
norms when expanding abroad. This shifts the focus from studying
discrete choices using either incentives or institutional perspectives.
Instead, we explore how CEO incentives explain heterogeneous
responses to host country institutional pressures using an integrated
incentive and institutional approach.
Our findings, however, are not only important to develop theory
explaining the persistence of heterogeneous MNC responses to host
country institutional pressures (e.g., Bae et al., 1998; Cantwell et al.,
2010; Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016; Holm et al., 2017; Regner &
Edman, 2014), but also points toward a more complex relationship
between CEO incentives and MNC responses to institutional norms.
In particular, previous HRM research exploring CEO incentives has
tended to overlook the social or institutional embeddedness of execu-
tives and their firms (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-Mejia,
2012; Zolotoy et al., 2018) and the few studies combining institutional
perspectives with agency theory have focused on explaining how
CEO incentives reinforce institutional norms (e.g., Berrone & Gomez-
Mejia, 2009; Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). Contra-
sting the notion that CEO incentives may reinforce institutional
norms, our study shows that in the context of foreign market entry
choices, CEO incentives can also explain deviations from institutional
norms. While this finding is consistent with the main argument in prior
work that CEOs make decisions with regards to either their incentives
(e.g., Musteen et al., 2009) or institutional forces (e.g., Ang et al.,
2015), our study combines these literatures to add the novel insight
that, in situations in which business and legitimacy risk are asymmet-
ric, CEO incentives can also shift the focus from legitimacy to business
risk reduction. This shift in focus from legitimacy to business risk
reduction due increases in CEO equity risk bearing, therefore, leads to
a greater likelihood of deviations from institutional norms. This adds a
new dimension to institutional conformance research by Oliver (1991)
through demonstrating that CEO incentives can also explain heteroge-
neous responses to institutional pressures.
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More broadly, our study also advances agency theory and HRM
literature's conceptualization of the behavioral effects of incentives
by addressing the criticism that both are under-socialized (Miller,
Hom, & Gomez-Mejia, 2001; Wowak, Gomez-Mejia, & Steinbach,
2017). Modeling of the principal-agent relationship typically fails to
consider social and institutional constraints that are likely to affect
CEO decision making (Trevino, Gomez-Mejia, & Balkin, 2018; Wise-
man et al., 2012). For instance, the agency literature has only sparsely
explored the extent to which the institutional environment may influ-
ence managerial agents to act opportunistically (Aguilera & Jackson,
2003). Our study's findings, therefore, complement prior research by
offering theory that explains how CEO opportunism intersects with
institutional norms to shape important decisions. Specifically, we pro-
vide the insight that it is important to also consider social expectations
(or legitimacy concerns) within the institutional field when predicting
agent risk behavior. As such, our study has highlighted important
boundaries to previous corporate governance literature suggesting
that agent risk bearing associated with equity based incentives influ-
ence agent risk taking (Benischke et al., 2019; Devers et al., 2008;
Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2013). These studies have
argued that the CEO will avoid high risk strategies at higher levels of
CEO firm-specific wealth-at-risk (or risk bearing). CEO/agent's con-
centration of firm-specific wealth has long been argued by agency
scholars to create agency costs for shareholders who are less risk
averse (based on the assumption that shareholders have diversified
portfolios; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979). We refine these argu-
ments by theorizing that this risk aversion created by risk bearing can
also affect internationalization decisions when CEOs attempt to miti-
gate business risk potentially created by those decisions. According to
agency theory, it is likely that the CEO is more willing to mitigate this
risk, hence deviating from industry norms, than their shareholders.
In terms of the foreign market entry literature, this literature
has explored numerous firm and contract level factors influencing
these decisions. From a transaction cost perspective, higher levels
of uncertainty or asset specificity could lead to acquisitions with
higher equity stakes or organic expansion to internalize transac-
tions between the host and home country entities (Hernandez &
Guillén, 2018). Real options suggest that uncertainty leads to lower
equity stakes—at least initially—so that more information can be
attained before making a further investment (Brouthers & Hennart,
2007). Our study complements those perspectives by demonstrat-
ing that, after controlling for uncertainty and prior investment
levels, CEO incentives influence the institutional effect (conform
by taking equity stakes similar to others). In doing so, we hope to
have advanced foreign market entry literature.
We do not find empirical support for our predicated moderation
effect of cultural tightness. While this result is surprising, it could be
due to more complex interactions between culture and more formal
aspects of the host country's institutional environment. That is, previ-
ous studies indicate that cultural institutions are particularly relevant
in the absence of strong formal institutions (Ang et al., 2015). There-
fore, CEOs may be less sensitive to constraints associated with cul-
tural institutions on their ability to deviate from the norm as their
equity risk bearing increases. Said differently, cultural tightness may
not be sufficient to offset the perceived benefits of deviating from
the norm in order to protect their wealth-at-risk of loss.
5.1 | Practical implications for human resource
professionals and their boards
For HRM professionals, our study provides the insight that CEO
incentives interact with institutional context to predict decision mak-
ing with regard to major strategic initiatives, such as foreign expan-
sion. Importantly, CEO incentives are influential in and of themselves,
however perhaps not as influential as the previous literature has
implied. Hence, we elucidate the shortcomings of incentives as a lever
for influencing CEO behaviors. The board and the HRM executives
who support them must analyze the institutional context to anticipate
CEO behaviors. If there is concern that the CEO will respond to insti-
tutional pressure through behaviors that the board believes are not
consistent with the long-term interests of important firm stake-
holders, our study suggests that incentives can be designed in a way
that could mitigate the CEO's tendency to conform with peer behav-
iors. Moreover, if the incentives are designed without heed to the
insight that CEO behaviors are influenced by both incentives and
institutional norms, there is an increased risk that HRM teams could
inadvertently encourage behaviors that may improve firm legitimacy
in the short-term, but increase the probability of firm failure in the
longer term.
For boards of directors attempting to influence their CEO, we
provide a theoretical framework that helps them understand how
their CEO has formed opinions on internationalization decisions. For
shareholders who are looking to invest in a business whose future
depends on cross-border expansion, our framework allows the share-
holders to anticipate whether they will be investing in a business
whose CEO is likely to help deliver on their vision. Such a framework
may allow a shareholder to avoid agency costs due to likely mis-
alignment between CEO incentives, institutional norms, and the
choices the shareholder would like the CEO to make in the future. For
debt or equity investors skeptical about cross-border acquisitions, our
framework may allow them to avoid investing in businesses whose
CEO is inclined to pursue such acquisitions, based on an assessment
of the CEO's incentives and the institutional norms.
5.2 | Limitations and future research
While our results offer important insights, this study is not free of lim-
itations. First, we have focused on one form of institutional pressures;
that is, mimetic institutional pressures. There are, however, other
forms of institutional pressures, namely coercive and normative pres-
sures, which also play an important role in isomorphic processes
(although these are less relevant in the decision context of this study
which focuses on a within country, within industry governance
choices). While there is no reason to believe that our theoretical
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framework cannot be applied to these different forms of pressures,
we encourage future research to validate our findings by replicating
our model with other forms of institutional pressures. Second, we
believe that there is an opportunity to explore how different CEO–
board relationships might further alter the hypothesized relationships.
For example, it might be possible that CEOs with greater power over
their boards have a greater amount of social resources which should
strengthen the proposed moderating effects. Similarly, firm level fac-
tors may interact with CEO incentives to influence foreign market
entry decisions. Lastly, our results are based on data from U.S. firms.
The focus on U.S. firms allows us to better attribute cross-border
acquisition decisions to the CEO given that those CEOs have rela-
tively greater discretion than their counterparts in other countries
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). Future research could pursue the ques-
tion if the effects reported in our study vary across home countries
due to differences in institutional environments.
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ENDNOTES
1 Consistent with prior research (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Gomez-Mejia,
Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Larraza-
Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Miller, Wise-
man, & Gomez-Mejia, 2002), we define business risks as the likelihood
of performance failures, or lower than expected returns when the firm
makes particular strategic choices under bounded rationality. Legitimacy
risk, on the other hand, refers to the potential harm to the organization
resulting from lack of compliance with institutional norms or expecta-
tions (Suchman, 1995). Hence, if business risk refers to the downside
unpredictability of business outcomes, which has been measured in
terms of the probability and magnitude or potential downside outcomes
(Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Tosi &
Gomez-Mejia, 1989), drawing on this logic, legitimacy risk refers to the
probability of adverse outcomes for firm legitimacy.
2 Although prior studies assume that taking a greater equity stake in a tar-
get is generally associated with greater risk (e.g., Musteen et al., 2009),
we acknowledge that this is not always the case. Our theory suggests
that the business risk when acquiring an equity stake in a target in cross-
border acquisitions is not primarily a function of the size of the equity
stake but rather of the mismatch between industry norm and firm-
specific resources and capabilities that would determine the optimal
(firm-specific) equity stake.
3 Some studies also consider the possibility that an increase in equity com-
pensation motivates CEOs to take greater business risks (e.g., Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007); however, this is only the case in situations in which
their equity compensation is largely insulated from downside risk
(Martin et al., 2013; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) which is not the
case in the context of this study.
4 We also use an accounting-based measure of performance in sensitivity
testing. In particular, we use return on assets measured as net income
divided by total assets. Using this alternative measure yields similar results.
5 We also included a control variable that captures the focal firm's owner-
ship concentration. Although the ownership concentration variable is
significant at the 0.1 level, the results are qualitatively similar to those
reported in our main models. We did not include this variable in our main
models given that we were able to obtain the data necessary to calculate
this variable for only 37% of observations included in our full sample.
6 The maximum deviation is 90% given that we exclude portfolio invest-
ments from our analyses (acquisitions whereby less than 10% equity is
acquired in the foreign target).
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these tests.
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